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A.1 Introduction 
Regulations that establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS) are being developed by a consortium of government, industry, and academic institutions. These 
requirements will apply to detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate 
UAS with the National Airspace System (NAS) and are determined according to their contribution to the 
overall level of safety required to operate in the airspace. Several key gaps must be addressed in order to 
link equipment requirements to an airspace level of safety. Foremost among these is the calculation of the 
relative effectiveness of a particular system to mitigate violations of a separation standard with other 
aircraft, which is known as the system’s “risk ratio [1].” The risk ratio is calculated as the probability of 
mid-air collision with a DAA system divided by the probability of mid-air collision without a DAA 
system. The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination with the risk ratios of other collision avoidance 
mitigations, will determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms of the number of mid-air 
collisions per flight hour. 
Defining the risk ratio that the DAA system must provide to ensure the safety of the airspace requires: 1) 
an evaluation of the current airspace, and 2) a simulated evaluation that incorporates UAS aerodynamic 
performance and mission characteristics of future UAS operations that are projected to be conducted in 
areas where they could interact with current operations. Appendix A focuses on quantifying the frequency 
of encounters that exist in the current airspace and what could occur with the introduction of UAS. These 
results, combined with an evaluation of the unmitigated risk of collision and a desired level of safety of 
the airspace, will yield a required risk ratio of the DAA system. 
A.2 Definition of Airborne Encounter 
Appendix A quantifies the frequency of airborne encounters between aircraft in the absence of separation 
assurance mitigations. The unmitigated rate of encounters is investigated for interactions occurring in 
historical data as well as interactions that could occur from proposed UAS missions. An encounter is 
notionally determined by where the responsibility of a DAA system to mitigate a potential threat should 
begin, referred to as the Self-Separation Threshold (SST). Since manufacturers may have differing 
operational requirements, the SST value may be unique for each system. For this safety evaluation, the 
approach was to use a metric similar to the well clear definition, whose parameter values would yield 
encounters that were just prior to or outside of a generic SST definition. The proposed well clear 
definitions derived from a recent FAA report [1], a dedicated U.S. Government workshop on well clear 
[2], and variations on methods used by Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II [3], [4] 
form the basis for defining an airborne encounter. 
A metric originally used in the TCAS collision detection logic to estimate the time to closest point of 
approach (CPA) between two aircraft is based on the concept of “tau,” which is calculated as the ratio of 
slant range (𝑟) between aircraft to their range rate (𝑟) and measured in seconds: 𝜏 = −𝑟/𝑟. (1) 
As described in the TCAS II Manual [3], one issue with the tau metric is that the calculated tau may be 
large even when the physical separation may be quite small because the rate of closure is very low (e.g., 
encounters where two flights are flying at approximately the same speed, on the same heading, offset by a 
small distance). In such a situation, the calculated tau value no longer assures adequate separation because 
a sudden acceleration that increases the closure rate (e.g., a turn) would not provide sufficient alerting 
time to avoid a loss of well clear. To provide protection for these types of encounters, a modified alerting 
threshold, often referred to as “modified tau,” is used by TCAS II. This metric uses a new parameter, 
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“distance modification” (DMOD), to provide a minimum range at which to alert regardless of the 
calculated value of tau. Modified tau (𝜏!"#) is computed as: τ!"# = -­‐ !!-­‐!"#!!!! for  r ≥ DMOD0 for  r < DMOD, (2) 
where the distance modification represents a threat boundary encircling the ownship aircraft that triggers 
an alert when the boundary is violated. 
The modified tau metric was introduced to address the slow-closure-rate scenarios that caused a collision 
hazard because they were not identified by the tau metric; however, modified tau also has limitations. For 
instance, in situations where aircraft are on converging paths with a high rate of closure and a large miss 
distance, the modified tau metric will indicate that an alert is required. TCAS II addresses this limitation 
in the tau and modified tau measures by applying a filter for the horizontal miss distance (HMD) at CPA. 
This filter removes alerts for encounters in which separation at CPA is greater than the HMD parameter. 
The following definition is considered a qualitative definition of an airborne encounter between a pair of 
aircraft. This definition uses the modified tau calculation similar to the collision detection logic in TCAS 
II. It consists of a set of criteria based on temporal and spatial criteria. 
The criterion in the horizontal dimension is specified as: 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎  1:    0   ≤   𝜏!"# ≤ 𝜏!"#∗   , (3) 
where 𝜏!"# denotes the modified tau given by (2) and 𝜏!"#∗  denotes a constant value that is a threshold 
for the modified tau calculations. 
The criterion in the vertical dimension is specified as: 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎  2:           𝛥ℎ   ≤ 𝑍𝑇𝐻𝑅, (4) 
where 𝛥ℎ is the current altitude separation and 𝑍𝑇𝐻𝑅 denotes a constant value that is a threshold for 
altitude separation. 
From (3) and (4), an airborne encounter is defined as: 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟:    𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎  1  𝑖𝑠  𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒    𝐴𝑁𝐷  𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎  2  𝑖𝑠  𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒. (5) 
The parameters defining an airborne encounter were chosen such that they captured interactions between 
aircraft pairs prior to relative states that would constitute a loss of well clear. For reference, an encounter 
would be identified in a similar time horizon as when a DAA system may alert the pilot of a potential 
threat. The airborne encounter definition is not meant to imply formal criteria as to when alerting is 
expected; rather, it is defined to be sufficiently large to capture relevant interactions for the safety 
evaluation. The assumption is that a generic SST value would have a modified tau of 90 seconds, a 
DMOD of 4000 feet (ft), and a ZTHR of 1500 ft. Thus, the airborne encounter definition should yield 
parameters that are larger as to capture encounters just prior to an expected SST alert. The parameters of 
the airborne encounter definition used here are detailed in Table 1. 
 𝜏!"#∗  [s] DMOD [ft] ZTHR [ft] 
100 4000 2000 
Table 1: Airborne encounter parameters. 
A.3 Methodology 
A.3.1 Analyses 
The following section outlines the three analyses conducted in this study and describes the simulation 
platform and the data sources that are used in the evaluation. Analysis 1 evaluates the frequency of 
unmitigated encounters that currently exist in the airspace, and Analysis 2 determines the frequency of 
unmitigated encounters that could occur with the introduction of UAS. They are inputs to the calculation 
of the required risk ratio of the DAA system. One potential caveat of these analyses is that they may be 
affected by ATC-like mitigation for separation (5 nmi horizontal/1000 ft en route separation standard). 
Analysis 3 investigates this for Analysis 2 in terms of the encounter rate and relative state data (i.e., 
encounter geometry characteristics). 
A.3.1.1 Analysis 1: Determine Encounter Rates based on Historical Radar Data 
This analysis evaluates the aggregate rate of airborne encounters that occur between aircraft operating 
under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and other aircraft operating under IFR as well as those operating 
under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). To facilitate this analysis, raw measurements from air defense radar 
data are processed and synthesized into tracks. Aircraft are categorized at the instance of encounter as 
operating under IFR, operating under VFR with a Mode 3/A identifying code of 1200, or operating under 
VFR with no transponder. The raw radar data contains various characteristics that needed to be overcome, 
such as: inconsistent/absent Mode 3/A identification, multiple position reports for the same aircraft from 
different radar locations, position reports without altitude measurements, data dropouts, asynchronous 
position reports, and missing position reports. The radar measurements are processed into tracks for each 
aircraft, which are then compared to identify instances when an airborne encounter occurred. Analysis 1 
uses radar data from 21 days in 2012 and limits this data to aircraft position reports at or below FL180, 
above 500 ft (above ground level, or AGL), and within the continental United States (CONUS). Military 
formation flight operations are filtered from the data set since they intended to fly within close proximity 
and would otherwise skew the encounter data. 
A.3.1.2 Analysis 2: Determine Encounter Rates based on Simulated UAS Missions 
Fast-time simulations are conducted using the Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES) platform [5], 
[6] to estimate the rate of occurrence of encounters between UAS and VFR aircraft without mitigation. 
Each day of processed VFR radar track data from Analysis 1 is replayed in ACES as the simulation 
platform modeled UAS flights (about 20,000 in total, each performing one of 18 missions). The UAS and 
VFR data are compared to identify encounters and collect relative state data using the same filters as in 
Analysis 1. In addition, encounters where at least one flight is in ACES for less than 2 minutes are filtered 
out since these pop-up cases would have been prevented through pre-departure scheduling by air traffic 
control (ATC). Similarly, the calculation of UAS flight times to compute encounter rates started at two 
minutes after departure. It ended at arrival or the time of the last VFR flight track (whichever came first). 
A.3.1.3 Analysis 3: Investigate Effect of ATC Mitigation on UAS-VFR Encounters 
A potential caveat of the Analysis 2 simulations is that they do not include ATC-like mitigation for UAS-
manned IFR aircraft conflicts for separation (5 nmi horizontal/1000 ft vertical en route separation 
standard). Maneuvering UAS for separation conflicts with manned IFR aircraft could affect UAS-VFR 
encounter rates and relative state data. As such, a second set of ACES simulations is run with ATC-like 
mitigation for UAS-manned IFR aircraft conflicts provided by a conflict detection and resolution 
algorithm named Autoresolver [7] for four of the days used in Analysis 2 to investigate this. As in 
Analysis 2, VFR radar track data is replayed in ACES as the simulation platform modeled UAS flights. In 
addition, manned IFR flights are simulated using flight schedule and flight plan information from Aircraft 
Situation Display to Industry (ASDI) data [8]. 
UAS-VFR encounters are identified and relative state data are collected as in Analysis 2 by applying the 
same analysis scripts. The encounter rates in the mitigated runs of Analysis 3 are compared directly with 
the encounter rates in the unmitigated runs of Analysis 2. With regard to the relative state data, the two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS2) test is used as a coarse filter first to identify which state data had 
distributions that are different than their unmitigated counterparts. Then, CDF plots of these data are 
generated to determine which data are substantially different for practical purposes. If the UAS-VFR 
encounter rates and relative state data are similar with and without ATC-like mitigation, then the results 
from Analysis 2 can be used in the calculation of the required risk ratio of the DAA system. Otherwise, 
simulations with ATC-like mitigation will need to be run for the other 17 days of traffic data. 
A.3.2 Simulation Platform: Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES) 
ACES is a NAS-wide non-real-time simulation tool [5], [6] used in Analysis 2 and Analysis 3. The ACES 
platform models and simulates the NAS using interacting agents representing center control, terminal 
flow management, airports, individual flights, and other NAS elements. These agents exchange messages 
between one another to model real-world information flows. This distributed, agent-based system is 
designed to emulate the highly-interconnected nature of the NAS, making it a suitable tool to evaluate 
current and envisioned airspace concepts. ACES has a large set of four-degree-of-freedom aircraft models 
that it uses to simulate flights, including many models that mimic the flight characteristics of UAS aircraft 
(such as Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow, etc.).  
One of the inputs to ACES is the flight demand set, which consists of all of the flights to be simulated 
with their aircraft type, origin and destination airports, departure times, and flight plans. In Analysis 2 and 
Analysis 3, UAS mission flight demand sets, described in A.3.3.2, are used as inputs to the ACES 
platform. In Analysis 3, manned IFR flight demand data sets derived from ASDI data, described in 
A.3.3.3, are also used. UAS-VFR encounter rates are calculated by overlaying historical VFR flights 
produced from air defense radar, described in A.3.3.1, with ACES-simulated UAS missions and/or 
manned IFR flights. 
A.3.3 Traffic Scenarios 
A.3.3.1 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) Air Defense Radar Data 
The VFR traffic data used in all analyses and the IFR traffic data used in Analysis 1 are collected from the 
84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. The RADES collect data 
through the Eastern and Western Defense sectors. They provide that data to a variety of government 
entities, including the FAA and the Department of Defense. They ensure that there is reliable and accurate 
sensor information to support military day-to-day operations, contingencies, and specialized activities 
(e.g. counter-narcotics, search and rescue, etc.). Continuous real-time feeds are maintained from short-
range radars in the interior of the United States as well as long-range air route surveillance radars that 
cover the perimeter. The raw radar data return can include: time, the four-digit Mode 3/A identifying code 
squawked by aircraft, quantized altitude measurements reported by the target, and range and azimuth 
measurements. Note: Not all radar returns included the four-digit Mode 3/A identifying code and the 
altitude measurements. 
For the purposes of this evaluation, aircraft whose radar data contain a four-digit discrete Mode 3/A 
transponder code (that is not 1200) are considered to be operating under IFR. On the other hand, aircraft 
squawking a Mode 3/A transponder code of 1200 are classified as cooperative aircraft operating under 
VFR. Likewise, when no Mode 3/A transponder code is present, the aircraft are classified as a non-
cooperative aircraft operating under VFR. In the radar data set, an aircraft’s transponder code may change 
(e.g., aircraft with a four-digit discrete transponder code begins squawking 1200) during portions of its 
flight for various reasons. Due to this characteristic of the data, when evaluating aircraft encounter events, 
the classification of an aircraft’s flight rules and transponder status (IFR, cooperative VFR, or non-
cooperative VFR) occurs at the initial instance of the encounter event. 
To build tracks to use in the ACES simulation, several days of traffic data were processed from four 
different months in 2012. Two algorithms were used to process the raw radar measurements and fuse 
them into tracks. The first algorithm was developed to create tracks for the IFR and cooperative VFR 
traffic. This algorithm first collected the raw radar measurements that had Mode C transponder codes, 
which included altitude measurements. Then, for every 10-second section of data, a minimum-spanning 
tree clustering sub-algorithm classified the radar position reports within a +/- 60-second time window into 
groups of radar returns, where each group represents one aircraft [9]. It also associated unique aircraft 
reports by comparing consecutive time windows amongst aircraft classified by the clustering. Tracks for 
aircraft uniquely identified by the sub-algorithm are then smoothed using a Kalman filter. 
Under a contract with NASA, Honeywell developed the complementary algorithm to create tracks for the 
non-cooperative VFR traffic. This algorithm processes raw radar returns from primary radar characterized 
as “search only,” meaning the primary radar reported a target that was not reinforced with a beacon sensor 
report. In these reports, the altitude information is unknown and, thus, the altitude must be assigned for 
use in the simulations and evaluations. This algorithm uses a Kalman filter based on a track association 
method to identify and generate tracks from multiple returns, and a single cruise altitude from a gamma 
distribution was assigned to each aircraft. The gamma distribution was generated from available 3D Air 
Route Surveillance Radar-4 (ARSR-4) returns for non-cooperative VFR aircraft. ARSR-4 radars are used 
to control airspace mainly around the borders of the CONUS. An assumption was made that the gamma 
altitude distribution constructed from the ARSR-4 radar returns are representative of the aggregate 
altitude distribution across the entire CONUS. Furthermore, a limitation of the non-cooperative VFR 
traffic in this analysis is that they are assigned a single cruise altitude and, thus, encounters that would 
have occurred due to climbs and descents are not represented because of a lack of sufficient radar data. 
Drop-outs and missing returns in the radar data lead to the creation of short flight segments during track 
generation by both algorithms. To overcome this limitation, a stitching algorithm is applied to connect 
flight segments. It is based on three criteria: 1) time between the end point of one track and the start point 
of another, 2) horizontal and altitude distance between those two points, and 3) the maximum allowable 
speed for traveling from the end point of one segment to the start point of the other segment. Further 
filters were applied to remove outliers associated with: 1) military formation flights, 2) flights under 20 
minutes in duration, and 3) erroneous average speeds. 
Twenty-one days were chosen across the four seasons of 2012 such that no adverse meteorological 
conditions were impacting the VFR traffic densities. Different days of the week and different weeks in 
each of the months were selected to account for variability in weekday and seasonal traffic densities. The 
selected days used in Analysis 1 and Analysis 2 are shown in Table 2. A subset of four days was used in 
Analysis 3 of UAS-VFR encounter rates and relative state data with ATC-like mitigation: January 11, 
April 21, July 17, and October 6, 2012. 
 
January 2012 
Su M Tu W Th F Sa 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
29 30 31     
        
April 2012 
Su M Tu W Th F Sa 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
29 30      
        
July 2012 
Su M Tu W Th F Sa 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
29 30 31     
        
October 2012 
Su M Tu W Th F Sa 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
28 29 30 31    
        
Table 2: Selected days in 2012 for VFR traffic scenarios. 
A.3.3.2 Proposed UAS Missions 
The FAA’s UAS Integration Concept of Operations (FAA CONOPS) [10] requires that UAS operate 
under IFR and conduct operations in airspace not segregated from manned air traffic. One key challenge 
for UAS integration into the NAS is that the operations and flight characteristics typical of UAS differ 
from those of most manned IFR aircraft. While manned IFR aircraft usually fly from origin to destination 
along fixed airways and jet routes at a single cruise altitude, UAS are expected to fly “mission-oriented” 
flight plans that can include many turns and altitude changes within a limited geographic area. The 
differences in flight plans between UAS and manned aircraft will create different encounter rates and 
characteristics. Modeling expected UAS operations is necessary in order to accurately predict the safety 
of DAA systems during operations in the NAS. The mission characteristics used in this study are 
consistent with the missions outlined in the FAA CONOPS [10], RTCA DO-320 [11], and a recent Volpe 
Report [12]. Intelligent Automation, Inc. (IAI) developed the mission sets, in collaboration with and 
under the supervision of NASA [13], [14]. 
The proposed UAS missions were identified by the stakeholder community and literature reviews, 
constructed by talking to subject matter experts, socio-economic analysis, and stakeholder input, and 
verified through simulation. The 18 UAS missions used in this study were chosen to be representative of 
potential future operations in the NAS (e.g., cargo transport, autonomous and remotely piloted on-demand 
air taxi, strategic and tactical fire monitoring, atmospheric sampling, air quality monitoring, flood 
inundation mapping and stream flow monitoring, etc.). Each mission consists of a set of flights that have 
altitude, speed, aircraft performance, takeoff times, duration, and geographic constraints that are dictated 
by its distinct requirements and objectives. The UAS flight data set consists of approximately 20,000 
flights and 26,000 flight hours over a 24-hour period (after applying the filters described in A.3.1). 
None of the analyses included mitigation to separate UAS aircraft from aircraft operating under VFR; 
therefore, the UAS missions will come within close proximity to VFR traffic and other UAS. For this 
study, interactions between two UAS are not analyzed and do not affect the encounter statistics. Each 
UAS flight is independent of the others in analysis and simulation; therefore, all UAS missions were 
combined in a single flight data set, which were simulated in ACES against different days of VFR traffic 
in Analysis 2 and Analysis 3. 
The UAS aircraft models used in this study are derived using performance data and follow the Base of 
Aircraft Data (BADA) model formats. The BADA-formatted models were generated from industry data 
[15] and validated by IAI [16]. UAS missions were simulated in ACES using representative UAS aircraft 
types whose performance would meet at least the minimum level required. 
A.3.3.3 Aircraft Situation Display to Industry (ASDI) 
ASDI data are processed into ACES input files to simulate NAS traffic operations in the ACES platform 
to measure the effect of ATC-like mitigation for UAS-manned IFR aircraft conflicts for separation on 
UAS-VFR encounter rates and relative state data (Analysis 3). For a particular day, the demand schedule 
and set of flight plans are generated by combining information from various NAS messages in ASDI data 
[8] and converted into an ACES flight input file [e.g., flight plan, cruise altitude, and cruise true airspeed 
data are extracted from the ASDI FZ (Flight Plan Information) message]. The last filed flight plan before 
takeoff for each aircraft is used as their respective desired route. ASDI data for any timespan can be 
converted into an ACES flight input file. 
A.3.4 ATC-like Mitigation Model: Autoresolver 
To investigate the effect of ATC-like mitigation for UAS-manned IFR aircraft conflicts for separation (5 
nmi horizontal/1000 ft vertical en route separation standard) on UAS-VFR encounter rates and relative 
state data in Analysis 2, a set of ACES simulations is run with ATC-like mitigation provided by a conflict 
detection and resolution algorithm named Autoresolver in Analysis 3. Autoresolver has been used in both 
fast-time simulations [17] and real-time human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations [18]. It attempts to resolve 
aircraft conflicts that are predicted to occur between 1 and 8 minutes in the future using a maneuver that 
causes the minimum amount of delay. It considers a variety of maneuver types, such as path stretch, 
direct-to, step altitude, temporary altitude, and speed change [7]. It also incorporates heuristics derived 
from controller feedback in HITL simulations to model ATC preferences when determining which 
aircraft to maneuver, such as: 
• If aircraft A is an arrival and aircraft B is not an arrival, then Autoresolver prefers to maneuver 
aircraft B, 
• If aircraft A has just reached its desired cruise altitude, then Autoresolver prefers to maneuver 
aircraft B 
• If aircraft A is in cruise and aircraft B is not in cruise, then Autoresolver prefers to maneuver 
aircraft B 
• If aircraft A was maneuvered for a previous conflict more recently than aircraft B, then 
Autoresolver prefers to maneuver aircraft B 
The version of Autoresolver used in this study (specifically, in Analysis 3) is the legacy version that 
separates IFR-to-IFR conflict aircraft (both manned and UAS) to the ATC en route separation criteria (5 
nmi horizontally/1000 ft vertically). In this study, Autoresolver is also configured such that conflict 
resolution maneuvers are required to maintain (secondary) separation of 1.5 nmi horizontally/500 ft 
vertically with (secondary) other IFR and VFR traffic. This legacy version of Autoresolver is not to be 
confused with the version adapted for UAS detect-and-avoid well clear separation known as 
Autoresolver-AD (Adapted for DAA) that is not used in this analysis. 
A.3.5 Summary of Analysis Methodologies 
Table 3 is a summary of the simulation platform (if any) and input data used in Analyses 1, 2, and 3. 
 
Analysis ACES ATC-like mitigation 
(Autoresolver) 
IFR radar 
data 
VFR radar 
data 
Proposed UAS 
missions 
ASDI data 
1 N N Y Y N N 
2 Y N N Y Y N 
3 Y Y N Y Y Y 
Table 3: Summary of simulation platform and input data. 
A.4 Results 
A.4.1 Analysis 1 
This section focuses on the aggregate rates of airborne encounters between aircraft flying at or below 
FL180, above 500 ft AGL, and occurring within the CONUS. The aggregate rates are representative of a 
NAS-wide data set consisting of 21 days of historical data from four months (January, April, July, and 
October) in 2012. 
Figure 1 depicts the aggregate rate of airborne encounters between two aircraft operating under IFR, 
between an aircraft operating under IFR and an aircraft operating under VFR squawking 1200 
transponder code (cooperative VFR), and between an aircraft operating under IFR and an aircraft 
operating under VFR with no transponder (non-cooperative VFR). An airborne encounter, as defined in 
A.2, between two aircraft operating under IFR occurred about once every half hour. Likewise, an 
encounter between an IFR and a cooperative VFR aircraft occurred about once every 2.7 hours, and an 
encounter between an IFR and a non-cooperative VFR aircraft occurred about once every 5.7 hours. 
The relative differences between these encounter rates are expected. Two aircraft operating under IFR are 
more likely to encounter each other due to the nature of the encounter definition—which provides a larger 
area buffer to detect conflicts given a larger closure rate between aircraft—and the nature of IFR aircraft, 
which generally fly faster than VFR aircraft. Furthermore, aircraft operating under IFR are more likely to 
fly fixed airways and naturally reduce their separation near airports. In contrast, VFR traffic typically 
occupy airspace altitude 10,000 ft and below and generate relatively slower closure rates with aircraft 
operating under IFR. Overall, given the definition of airborne encounter, an aircraft operating under IFR 
should expect to encounter another aircraft approximately once every 0.4 hours. 
 
 
Figure 1: Encounters per IFR flight hour between IFR aircraft and: 1) other IFR aircraft, 2) aircraft 
operating under VFR squawking Mode 3/A transponder code of 1200 (cooperative VFR), and 3) aircraft 
operating under VFR with no transponder (non-cooperative VFR). 
A.4.2 Analysis 2 
Similar to Analysis 1, the investigation of UAS-VFR encounter rates and relative state data in Analysis 2 
is focused on airborne encounters that occur at or below FL180, above 500 ft AGL, and within the 
CONUS. In addition, encounters where at least one flight is in the ACES simulation for less than 2 
minutes are filtered out, and the calculation of UAS flight times begins 2 minutes after departure and ends 
at arrival or the time of the last VFR flight track (whichever came first). As in Analysis 1, the aggregate 
data for UAS-VFR unmitigated encounter rates are reported for 21 days of historical data from four 
months (January, April, July, and October) in 2012. 
Figure 2 plots the aggregate rate of airborne encounters between a simulated UAS aircraft and an aircraft 
operating under VFR squawking 1200 transponder code (cooperative VFR) and between a simulated 
UAS aircraft and an aircraft operating under VFR with no transponder (non-cooperative VFR). Nearly 
90% of UAS-VFR encounters were UAS-cooperative VFR encounters. An airborne encounter between a 
UAS and a cooperative VFR aircraft occurred about once every 5.0 hours. Likewise, an encounter 
between a UAS and a non-cooperative VFR aircraft occurred approximately once every 39.4 hours. 
The relative comparison between these encounter rates is expected due to the lack of altitude information 
in the non-cooperative VFR radar data (see A.3.3.1), which constrained them to be assigned a single 
cruise altitude in the ACES simulations. As a result, potential encounters that could have occurred due to 
climbs and descents are not represented. Overall, a UAS is expected to encounter a VFR aircraft about 
once every 4.4 hours. 
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Figure 2: Encounters per UAS flight hour between UAS and VFR aircraft. 
A.4.3 Analysis 3 
A separate set of ACES simulations was run to investigate the potential caveat that the unmitigated UAS-
VFR encounter rates and relative state data may be affected by conflict resolution maneuvers issued to 
UAS for separation with manned IFR flights. Four of the days in Analysis 2 (January 11, April 21, July 
17, and October 6, 2012) were run with ATC-like mitigation provided by a conflict detection and 
resolution algorithm named Autoresolver that models ATC preferences regarding which aircraft in a 
conflict to maneuver based on controller feedback in HITL simulations (see A.3.4 for additional details). 
The ATC-like mitigations issued by Autoresolver (about 3000 per simulation for UAS-manned IFR 
conflicts, 60% of which went to UAS) were infrequent (about one Autoresolver mitigation to UAS per 
13.75 UAS flight hours) and did not substantially affect UAS-VFR encounter rates. As illustrated in 
Figure 3, the biggest difference in any of the four days relative to the unmitigated runs is less than 1.5%. 
Overall, the UAS-VFR encounter rates are only about 1% higher in the mitigated runs compared to the 
unmitigated runs. This can be attributed to the randomness of unexpected accelerations by VFR flights 
(i.e., playback tracks) in the vicinity of UAS-manned IFR conflicts and resolution maneuvers. 
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Figure 3: Difference in UAS-VFR encounter rate with mitigation relative to without mitigation. 
With regard to the relative state data of UAS-VFR encounters in the mitigated and unmitigated runs, the 
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS2) test was used to identify whether modified tau and the following 
data for the UAS and VFR had different distributions: 1) latitude, 2) longitude, 3) altitude (AGL), 4) 
altitude (mean sea level, or MSL), 5) heading, 6) turn rate, 7) airspeed, 8) vertical speed, and 9) 
acceleration. The distributions of the following relative state data were different at the 5% significance 
level: 
• Modified tau 
• UAS airspeed 
• VFR airspeed 
• VFR turn rate 
• UAS acceleration 
• VFR acceleration 
Plots of the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of these data from the mitigated and unmitigated 
runs were then generated to determine which relative state data were substantially different for practical 
purposes. Each of the six relative state data flagged by the KS2 test had mitigated and unmitigated CDFs 
with substantial overlap (for example, see Figure 4 of the CDFs of modified tau data). This indicates that 
ATC-like mitigations issued by Autoresolver for UAS-manned IFR conflicts did not substantially affect 
the relative state data of UAS-VFR encounters at an aggregate level. 
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Figure 4: CDFs of modified tau for UAS-VFR encounters in unmitigated and mitigated simulations. 
The 1% difference in UAS-VFR encounter rates (see Figure 3) and the similarities in the relative state 
data (see Figure 4) indicate that ATC-like mitigations for UAS-manned IFR conflicts do not affect UAS-
VFR encounters at an aggregate level. Thus, the results of Analysis 2 can be used in the calculation of the 
required risk ratio of the DAA system. 
A.5 Conclusion 
Two analyses were conducted to estimate the frequency of unmitigated encounters: 1) historical air 
defense radar data of aircraft operating under IFR and VFR were synthesized and processed into tracks 
that were analyzed to compute aggregate rates of airborne encounters between aircraft operating under 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and other aircraft operating under IFR as well as those operating under 
Visual Flight Rules (VFR), and 2) eighteen UAS missions consisting of approximately 20,000 flights 
were also simulated against the historical VFR aircraft traffic using a NAS-wide fast-time simulation 
platform to compute the aggregate rates of airborne encounters between UAS and VFR aircraft. In both 
cases, twenty-one days total from a cross section of four months in 2012 were used. In addition, for the 
UAS-VFR analysis, an assumption regarding the influence of ATC mitigation for UAS-IFR conflicts on 
UAS-VFR interactions was also verified by using a model of ATC-like mitigation to simulate UAS 
missions being separated from aircraft operating under IFR. 
Analysis 1 computed frequency of encounters between aircraft operating under IFR and other aircraft. It 
was concluded that an IFR flight would encounter another aircraft every 0.4 hours on average, however 
only encounter a cooperative VFR aircraft every 2.7 hours and a non-cooperative VFR aircraft every 5.7 
hours. The differences in closure rates, airspace structure, geographic operational areas, and frequency 
and duration of aircraft operating under different flight rules are reflected in their relative encounter rates. 
Analysis 2 computed the frequency of encounters between simulated UAS aircraft and aircraft operating 
under VFR. It was concluded that a UAS would encounter a VFR aircraft about once every 4.4 hours on 
average. Nearly 90% of the time the VFR aircraft involved in the encounter was squawking Mode 3/A 
transponder code of 1200 (i.e., cooperative VFR). 
A potential caveat that the unmitigated UAS-VFR encounter rates and relative state data in Analysis 2 
could be affected by conflict resolution maneuvers issued to UAS for separation with manned IFR flights 
was also investigated in Analysis 3 through simulations with an ATC-like mitigation model. The 
difference in encounter rates between the mitigated and unmitigated simulations was 1%, and statistical 
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tests and CDF plots of the relative state data did not find substantial differences. In combination, these 
results indicate that ATC-like mitigations for UAS-manned IFR conflicts do not affect UAS-VFR 
encounters at an aggregate level, and the results of Analysis 2 can be used in the calculation of the 
required risk ratio for DAA systems. 
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